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Introduction 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville is well known for his critique of democracy.1 A French statesman, he 
was left with the legacy of the French Revolution that had torn his fatherland and had 
changed the course of human history for good. Tocqueville, unlike many of his 
contemporaries, believed that the Revolution ought not to be seen as incidental or 
unexpected, despite the fact that it was without precedent in human history and so tarnished 
with human blood. The French Revolution is part of a trend that traces the path of 
democracy. Living in the revolutionary France of the nineteenth century, he hoped to find 
out what France may expect from its course of civilization, what it may expect from its 
democracy. Tocqueville was a social critic: he deplored what he saw happening around him 
in France. He believed that France was poorly governed. He was critical of the rise of the 
bourgeoisie and believed that everything had become vulgar, low and mean. He rejected the 
rising materialism as “a dangerous disease of the human mind”, 2  which he found in 
positivism (Comte and St. Simon)3 and socialism (Proudhon and Blanc).4 He believed that 
scientific and economic determinisms were serious threats to liberty and human dignity, 
which he attempted to defend.5 He attributed the February Revolution (1848) to the rise of 
socialism, and held the French people responsible for voting a dictator in power – events 
from which he, as a Member of Parliament and a Minister of Foreign Affairs, personally 
suffered.6 Tocqueville did not believe that the age in which he lived was an age of progress: 
he hoped that further intellectual and moral regression could be checked.7
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Unlike many of his contemporaries who tried “to prove that human misery is the 
work of laws and not of Providence, and that poverty can be suppressed by changing the 
conditions of society”, 8  Tocqueville believed that Christianity has been the ground for 
modern civilization (that is, the democratic civilization9). For him, there could be no liberty 
and human dignity without the Christian faith. For him, the crisis of modernity is the crisis 
of the modern individual without religion, without hope and without faith. The only way of 
getting out of this misery is by reconciling the city of man with the city of God, by 
accepting that the norms of government ought to be no lower than those given by 
Christianity. Tocqueville saw the task of governments or rather, of statesmen, as that of 
guiding the human destiny towards the good life and preventing it from degenerating into 
servitude and barbarism. The great challenge for modernity was to fight against the 
barbarians.10 The task of the government was not so much to use the state as an instrument 
for the satisfaction of wants that the people happen to have, but “to make men great” – to 
turn persons into citizens. Tocqueville’s liberalism is not based on the right to be mediocre, 
but on the right to be good. His “new liberalism” is an attempt to reform the liberal state or 
the bourgeois state, which in his eyes is totally unfitted to act as the nation’s moral 
educator. 
 
 
1. Tocqueville’s attempt to raise the standard for public conduct 
 
Though Tocqueville must certainly be seen as a “child of the Enlightenment”, as he thought 
of himself, the most important characteristic of his liberalism is that he brings religion back 
to the core of thought and action.11 He does not believe that religion and politics can be 
separated if people are to remain civilized and free. As a liberal, he certainly holds that 
Church and State should be separated, calling for a revivification of “the old true spirit of 
the Catholic clergy, which is that it should belong only to the Church [and not to the 
State]”,12 arguing that “when religion clings to the interests of the world, it becomes almost 
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as fragile a thing as the powers of earth.”13 Therefore, he says: “I respect religion, but I 
have never been nor will I ever be a man of the clergy. I honor the priest in church, but I 
will always put him outside the government.”14 As a Catholic, however, he believes that 
religious norms, discourses and symbols are important for the regulation of public life, for 
the protection of liberty and dignity in the face of materialist temptations.15 Religion, like 
politics and ethics, is never a private affair, a matter of private choices. The Enlightenment 
had misunderstood the character of liberty and freedom of choice, and wrongly saw religion 
as an enemy of modernity and liberalism. 16  According to Tocqueville, liberty is not 
sustained by reason, but by faith. 17  With its emphasis on reason, the Enlightenment 
proceeds from the premise that the individual should be subject to no other authority than 
the dictates of his own individual reason, which it typically reduced to a calculus that is able 
to the validity and reliability of facts and mathematical relations but nothing more (Hobbes). 
As a consequence, the Enlightenment had systematically weakened the authority of 
institutional religion, which in turn had brought about a severe authority crisis, which had 
paved the way for the exercise of uncontrolled power. 18  Since Tocqueville holds that 
“liberty regards religion as its companion in all its battles and its triumphs, as the cradle of 
its infancy and the divine source of its claims”, 19  he believes that religion must again 
become a public concern shared by all citizens.  
 However, Tocqueville does not believe that ecclesiastical authority is any longer 
able to guide modern persons, who do not recognize its claims. Modern, autonomous and 
emancipated people are critical towards hierarchy and do not participate in the tradition. In 
the modern era, where the Church is no longer at the core but is instead at the periphery of 
social life, it is the nation state that has the authority of shaping society. The great 
spokesmen of the Church that Tocqueville admires so much – Bossuet, Bourdaloue, 
Fénélon, Flechier – no longer exist and the priest can no longer be charged with the 
responsibility for the well being of humankind.20 That is to say, in the modern world of 
liberalism, the Church can no longer guide people to a state of faith and liberation. 
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Modernity has politicized thought and action, and therefore transformation can only be 
brought about by political means. As he says, 
  
When men have accustomed themselves to foresee from afar what is likely to befall 
them in the world and to feed upon hopes, they can hardly confine their minds within 
the precise limits of life, and they are ready to break the boundary and cast their looks 
beyond. I do not doubt that, by training the members of a community to think of their 
future condition in this world, they would be gradually and unconsciously brought near 
to religious convictions. Thus the means that allow men, up to a certain point, to go 
without religion are perhaps, after all, the only means we still possess for bringing 
mankind back, by a long and roundabout path, to a state of faith.21
 
To bring humankind back to a state of faith, from a state of unsettled reason is de facto the 
singular object of Tocqueville’s political liberalism. The good life cannot be achieved 
without Goodness itself: it is only when people have faith, when they are personally in 
communion with God, that they can truly be free.22 “Despotism may govern without faith, 
but liberty cannot”,23 which implies that free governments are always made up of statesmen 
who have the genuine will to be liberated from sin.24
Being free, for Tocqueville, means having the will to go beyond one’s own human 
nature and become how God had meant one to be in His original creation. It means striving 
towards the Image of God, the perfection of which has been given to us in the person of His 
Christ. 25  Tocqueville’s understanding of liberty differs radically from that of the 
enlightenment thinkers. Liberty, for him, is not the absence of opposition, as it is for 
Hobbes, who argues that being free means not being hindered to do what one has a will to 
do. For Hobbes, being free does not mean having the will to liberate oneself from the 
passions that keep the soul enchained, but it means being able to do what the laws permit. 
Neither is liberty the triumph of individuality, as it is for John Stuart Mill, who believes that 
being free means having the power to develop oneself. The free person is the one who 
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displays his individuality, which means that his desires and projects are truly his own. In 
other words, for Mill, liberty is first and foremost personal liberty: a quality of the mind and 
character of autonomous persons who are emancipated from religious and political 
authority. Mill confuses emancipation and liberation. He argues that for the triumph of 
liberty, it is necessary that all truth claims be detached from established authority. Truth is 
not determined by intellectual authority (e.g., the wisdom of the ages, the Thomist tradition), 
but is (temporarily) established by scientific methods.26 For Tocqueville, by contrast, not 
scientific method, but religion is the road to knowledge, to truth and to liberation.27
Tocqueville’s view of liberty is different from that of Hobbes and Mill. For 
Tocqueville, liberty is what it is for Montesquieu: the possession of the will power to do 
what one should love and in no way being constrained to do what one should not will.28 
Liberty is a divine gift that people are only able to receive if they have the will to receive it. 
Tocqueville says that “liberty is, in truth, a sacred thing”29  and that “grace constitutes 
liberty”.30 Liberty is sacred because the free person turns himself to his Creator. The free 
person loves freely, loves God with his own will. Fighting against liberty is, according to 
Tocqueville, fighting against God Himself. Being free means being liberated from the 
selfishness, jealousy and hard-heartedness that keep the soul in bondage – keeps the person 
away from communion with God.  
Tocqueville stresses that the spiritual reality of liberty can only be sensed by 
unsystematic and unclear inclinations of the soul – the reality of liberty remains accordingly 
hidden for the unbeliever who does not yet have the will to be liberated from his mediocrity. 
The believer is aware of things that are inaccessible to the unbeliever; it is a form of 
knowledge that comes from the spiritual experience of being free. Liberty cannot be put in 
an intellectual, poetic or scientific form; it cannot be explained what it means to be free to 
those who have not experienced liberty:  
 
Do not ask me to analyze this sublime yearning [need for liberty]; it has to be 
experienced. It simply comes into those noble souls that God has prepared to receive it, 
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filling them and setting them afire. There is no use trying to explain this to mediocre 
souls who have never felt it.31  
 
Tocqueville reserves the word “noble” for those who have truly willed to receive the gift of 
grace, which Tocqueville equates with freedom. Like St Augustine, he believes that the will 
of the “noble” has been perfected by grace. God’s provision becomes effective only for 
those who, of their own free will, choose to co-operate with Him. It is by the free will that 
the “noble” desire to be free and depart from their old selves, but it is by means of grace 
that their desire is actualized. Thus understood, to be or not to be free is always a matter of 
a free choice: “Man has no other enemy than himself, and in order to be happy and to be 
free, he has only to determine that he will be so.”32  
 Just as Tocqueville argues that being free is a matter of truly wanting to be free in 
communion with God, through the reception of grace (and hence freedom is always a 
struggle with the self), he also holds that everyone is able to recognize the source of his or 
her freedom. The will to be free and the corresponding option to be good is open to 
everyone: “God has given us the capacity to recognize good and bad and the freedom of 
choice to chose between them.”33 It is precisely because man can be free and good (if his 
will is well governed), that true statecraft, like true priesthood, is possible. It is only the one 
who succeeds in reconciling his free will with the good and who does not will evil, who can 
truly become a statesman. The statesman is charged with the responsibility of governing the 
citizens towards the free life, that is, the realization of self-governing community of citizens 
who freely obey free institutions. Statecraft is “the art of being free”;34 its objective is to 
liberate the governed from those passions that keep the soul in bondage and unite the crowd 
in virtue (pax). Hence, statecraft is really, in part, “soulcraft”, that is, the molding of 
citizens to the traditional, pre-liberal standard of virtue.35
While Tocqueville considers those who truly desire to be free and who hence opt 
for the good, as “noble”, he reserves the term “mediocre” for those who have no genuine 
passion for liberty (but prefer well being or comfort or autonomy) and who are rather 
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indifferent towards good and evil. Therefore, the mediocre person cannot legitimately 
govern others, because he does not make an unconditional choice for the good. In this sense, 
the mediocre person is his own enemy and does not have the will power to govern himself 
towards the good. And if he cannot govern himself towards the good, how can he govern 
others towards the good? Real freedom means self-government;36 real freedom is political 
liberty and this freedom requires that fundamental political and moral choices be made in 
accord with the good (summum bonum) of one’s eternal destiny. To make the right choice 
in any event, the person needs to be liberated from evil and falsehood. The mediocre person 
is caged in his own world. His soul is enslaved; he is incapable of governing himself, 
because his passions forge his fetters and his mind is intemperate. He is a slave to himself. 
In Tocqueville’s eyes, the mediocre person is the spiritually weak soul who has not enough 
will, courage and principle to guide and govern himself (let alone govern others). Whenever 
the laws provide the mediocre person with the political liberty to govern himself, he abuses 
his liberty by choosing evil and falsehood to gratify his pride and his anger. The mediocre 
person does, not what God wants, but what his own will commands. What separates the 
mediocre from the noble person, that is, what distinguishes enslavement from freedom, is 
the will to be liberated from sin. It is the quality of the will that makes the difference: the 
noble and the mediocre persons have different objects of love.  
It should not be concluded that Tocqueville’s distinction between the noble and the 
mediocre person is based on some sort of a spiritual aristocracy. Though it is true that God 
fills the noble person with the passion for liberty, it does not follow that some sort of a 
determined or predestined order is established. The noble souls are not simply the “elected” 
and the mediocre persons the “damned”. Christ has died for all human beings, including the 
mediocre ones. The mediocre person can always become free if he searches to overcome 
himself and truly comes to desire to be free: he must convert. It is the task of the noble 
person to guide him in this effort of becoming free from his old mediocre self. In the 
modern era, it is the task of the statesman to assist the mediocre person in becoming free by 
activating his will to become free. Liberty can only survive when the statesman guides the 
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mediocre person in his struggle against his passions for comfort. In other words, 
Tocqueville denies the right to be mediocre.    
 
 
2. Tocqueville’s reform of Enlightenment: transforming the passions 
 
When Tocqueville says that “a new science of politics is needed for a new world”,37 he not 
only asserts that the “old science of politics” has lost its legitimacy with the birth of a new 
world (that is, the world of democracy), but he also suggests that the “old science of 
politics” has lost its legitimacy in the modern era of crisis. Tocqueville’s “new science of 
politics” is a direct reference to the “old science of politics” of Hobbes, as he had 
announced it in his De Cive. Tocqueville considers Hobbes as the initiator of the political 
modernity and sees in his “science of politics” several elements that must be rectified in 
order to bring humankind back to a state of faith. Hobbes had provided humankind with a 
“science of politics”, which was able to pacify the religious conflicts of the seventeenth 
century. Hobbes had introduced a science that grounded knowledge in laws of (human) 
nature, which dictate people to live in peace for the sake of their own self-preservation. 
Hobbes had argued that the standards for human action had to be lowered if people were to 
live in peace – the only thing that human beings could possibly achieve in this world. For 
the sake of peace in the Christian community, Hobbes had argued that all Christian dogmas 
are merely prescripts of political obedience. For the sake of civil peace, Hobbes had argued 
that religion is not about serving God and His creatures on earth, but that it is a matter of 
private choice, opinion, and taste, like the choice of a political party. For the sake of peace, 
Hobbes had broken the unbreakable bond between God and humanity and had replaced it 
by the “commonwealth”. 
 Without denying the merits of civil peace,38 Tocqueville points at the unintended 
consequences of Hobbes's “science of politics”. Though it is true that Hobbes’s science had 
managed to pacify religious conflict and de-politicize religious differences, so that people 
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have accordingly been able to stop barbarous violence and live in peace, the price that has 
been paid for the peace agreement has been far too high. Tocqueville holds that the price 
that had to be paid for peace was liberty. The modern world of peace and pacification is the 
world in which the so-called mediocre person – which Tocqueville identifies as “the 
bourgeois” – has become victorious. Tocqueville sums up the misery of the modern 
condition with a sense of rhetorical despair: 
 
Do you not see that religious belief is shaken and the divine notion of right is declining, 
that morality is debased and the notion of moral right is therefore fading away? 
Argument is substituted for faith, and calculation for the impulses of sentiment. If, in 
the midst of this general disruption, you do not succeed in connecting the notion of 
right with that of private interest, which is the only immutable point in the human heart, 
what means will you have of governing the world except by fear?39
 
What had brought modernity into a deep authority crisis, according to Tocqueville, is the 
substitution of the unifying notion of absolute morality (obedience to God’s will, that is, 
serving others) by a notion of right derived from a calculus of private interests (that is, 
obedience to one’s own will, that is, serving one’s own passions). The most urgent private 
interest is, of course, the maintenance of the civil peace treaty, which is necessary for 
fulfilling one’s most pressing need, namely, self-preservation.40 Hobbes had substituted the 
passion for being free and being good by the collective need for civil peace, and 
accordingly, he had lowered the standards for human action: the spiritual struggle for virtue 
or excellence is replaced by the calculus of interest. It is in the interest of civil peace that 
the individual must transfer his right and virtues to govern himself to the state in order to 
secure his self-preservation. This dogma has weakened the passion for liberty: people lost 
their will to be free when they lost their desire to govern themselves to God. 
The object of Tocqueville’s “new science of politics” is to re-establish the Christian 
principles that Hobbes had sacrificed for the sake of civil peace. Whereas Hobbes places 
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morality within everyone’s reach, Tocqueville places the objects of human actions far 
beyond man’s immediate range.41 Tocqueville does not satisfy himself with anything less 
than virtue: responsibility, decency and mutual respect are not good enough for being free. 
Virtue is the free choice of what is good.42 Like Aquinas, he defines virtue as the free 
choice to obey God’s will that can be recognized by natural reason.43 Virtue is precisely 
that quality of the soul the possession of which will enable a person to obey God’s will and 
the lack of which will frustrate his effort. To act virtuously is not to act against inclination, 
but it is to act from the inclination towards God. Virtue, accordingly, encompasses more 
than moral sentiments: it requires the voluntary sacrifice of self-love, of one’s own 
inclination, to the will of God, through the cultivation of the virtues. It is not enough to be 
decent and tolerant: to be free we must be charitable, patient, pitiful, simple and enduring. 
These are moral aspirations that are much harder to fulfill than the moral aspirations that 
prevail in modern democracies. In the modern world, people are guided to become 
autonomous and actualize their own will, but virtue requires that we detest our own will and 
desire, against ourselves, to actualize the will of God and hence become free and good.44
More recently, several Catholic scholars have attempted to reconcile modernity and 
Christianity in their own ways, arguing that modernity is either a damning or liberating 
force. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that modernity is a damning force because its antagonism 
towards tradition makes that people have lost their theoretical and practical understanding 
of the virtues. MacIntyre believes that “there is no way to possess the virtues except as part 
of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of 
predecessors in which series heroic societies hold first place.” 45  Because modernity 
emancipates the self from tradition and hierarchical authority, morality loses its 
authoritative content, and morality becomes “individualized” and detached from one’s 
telos. MacIntyre ties virtue to the authority of tradition (intellectual tradition) rather than to 
liberty. People need the virtues to take control of their own lives, to become responsible not 
just for their habits, but also for their will. In contrast, for Tocqueville, the problem of 
modernity is not that it has created the autonomous person who is emancipated from the 
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religious and political community and from hierarchical authority, but that the 
Enlightenment has incorporated an “erroneous notion of liberty”. It is liberty rather than 
virtue that is misunderstood. Modern man does not understand liberty as self-government 
towards the good, but as autonomy, which, as Richard Sennett rightly observes, Tocqueville 
understands as “authority without love”. 46  The problem of autonomy is that it is not 
inspired by the passion for liberty, but by the passion for the self. Tocqueville stresses that 
in order to be free, man needs virtue – otherwise man falls victim to “individualism”, which 
is the retreat into the self. Individualism (the preference of the autonomous self to the public 
self of citizenship) is responsible for the loss of the virtues: 
 
Individualism is a calm and considered feeling, which disposes each citizen to isolate 
himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends…. 
Individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but in the long run it attacks 
and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness.47
    
In contrast with MacIntyre, Charles Taylor argues that modernity is a liberating 
force, because it liberates Christians from narrow mindedness.48 Taylor does not mourn the 
loss of the passion for liberty and virtue but emphasizes that the passion for autonomy 
generates a hatred of oppression, which is beneficial to humanity. According to Taylor, this 
modern, liberal hatred of oppression has constituted a regime of human rights. For him, 
Amnesty International is an association that is characteristic of modernity: it fights against 
the violation of human rights, against dehumanizing forces that were previously tolerated. 
Taylor neither suggests that Christians are called to accept the bourgeois dogmas of 
modernity nor does he propose a modernization of Christianity. Rather, he argues that 
Christians are called on to take “our modern civilization for another of those great cultural 
forms that have come and gone in human history”.49 Taylor calls on Christians to engage 
themselves in current problems, in a contemporary idiom. He does not propose a 
christianization of modernity. He does not propose to establish Christian standards for 
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human action and to guide the unbeliever back to a state of faith. He advises Christians to 
partake in the gentle conversation with humankind, rather than setting the standard for such 
conversation. By contrast, Tocqueville insists that, for the sake of modern civilization, for 
the sake of democracy, a synthesis has to be brought about between modernity and 
Christianity. Christians must fulfill their apostolic role in the modern democratic age as 
well, and inspire the “love of true liberty and regularity, respect for dignity of the 
individual, the wish to preserve the noble heritage of the Christian civilization we have been 
passed on”.50 He insists that “we believe that Christianity contains the principal element of 
modern civilization and the necessary condition for social progress.”51  
Simone Weil establishes the link between the modern human rights regime and the 
virtues.52 For her, virtue comes prior to right, because, as she believes, all social progress 
stems from the fulfillment of our obligations to our Creator. The duties that we have to our 
Creator and His creatures generate the establishment of a human rights regime. That is, the 
human rights regime is established by the recognition of the obligations that we have 
towards humankind in general and to our nation in particular. While working for Free 
France, Weil argues that the patriotic duties to regenerate France are grounded in the most 
vital need to reconcile the human will with divine will. It is for the sake of the personal soul 
that the French people are called on to fight against the enslaving forces of greed and 
ambition which are generated by the fascist, socialist, capitalist and communist domination 
– not only against foreign domination but also against the internal domination of the French 
bureaucratic state that has come to existence precisely through the domination of 
destructive passions. Liberation from the French bureaucratic state would mean getting rid 
of a sinful part of the soul so that all energies can be concentrated on other and better parts 
of the soul. For Weil, such liberation demands a transformation of our notion of 
“greatness”. If man is to become free, he must free himself from “the false notion of 
greatness”, which Weil associates with the pagans (particularly the Romans) and the 
barbarous imperialists of her own days. According to her, the possibility for liberty depends 
on the notion of greatness, which we internalize. She emphasizes that the only true notion 
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of greatness that can set us free is the virtue of charity, for it, alone, wears the Christian 
badge of humility. While Weil argues that modernity is a liberating force if modern people 
come to recognize that only Christ and his genuine followers are great, Tocqueville cannot 
hide his admiration for the so-called greatness of the pagans (including the Romans, though 
the Greeks are the greatest), the French Revolutionaries and the European empires. He 
admires the great passions of a Robespierre who, even though he may have been a 
spokesperson of the French bourgeoisie, had aspired to be a genuine republican citizen. He 
admires the personal greatness and imperial designs of Napoleon, who, though had a bad 
bourgeois taste and brought France to ruin, was a great courageous personality: 53  “I 
reproach it [the Napoleonic Empire] for the non-liberal side of its institutions, but at the 
same time I do full justice to the personal grandeur of Napoleon, the most extraordinary 
being, I say, who has appeared in the world for many centuries.”54
Tocqueville argues that some high and noble passion, difficulty or danger is 
necessary to inflame the passion for liberty and revivify the human spirit in the modern era 
so as to prepare the way to conversion.55 The greatest shortcoming in the emotional life of 
modern democratic people, in particular the middle classes, is that they lack the feeling of 
greatness: “What strikes me the most in our days is not that we do so many small things, but 
that we do not conceive any better the idea of greatness. The feeling of greatness is missing, 
and one would say that the imagination of greatness is dying away.”56  Modern people 
prefer a peaceful existence, free from care, to the dangers of political life. Tocqueville finds 
that the people of the modern world are more honest and more humane than the ancients, 
but that they lack the feeling of greatness that the ancients had. The ancients are the 
teachers of greatness. They were great, because they set themselves higher political tasks 
than pacification, peace and prosperity. They were great because they had the will to 
sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of the good of their fellow citizens, who in turn 
gave them their due honor. The ancients teach the potential nobility of man, they have 
taught man how to govern himself: “the historian of antiquity taught how to command; 
those of our time only teach obedience”.57 Of Plutarch’s Lives, he says that it is a book that 
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makes him sad and gets him attached: “These men of Plutarch, especially the Greeks, are 
remarkable where we are vulgar.”58 The life of the commanders has “a peculiar charm” that 
“does not exist in our times and I fall flat on my face when I get out of my dream to 
confront reality”.59  
Tocqueville's admiration for the great passions of the ancients goes hand in hand 
with his rejection of the indifference that, according to him, characterizes the moderns. 
Hobbes believes that the human intellectual and practical orientation is perverted by the 
feeling of greatness – a kind of perversion that threatens the civil order. Tocqueville, by 
contrast, argues that the feeling of greatness sustains the civil order: the great passions urge 
statesmen and citizens to combat foreign threats and resist private indulgence. He believes 
that the same powerful passions that motivated the great commanders can be revived in the 
modern era. It does not mean that he believes that it would be desirable to adopt the 
standard of action of the ancients. On the contrary, he admires their great passions, but he 
does not consider them as virtuous. Tocqueville conceives “virtue in a thousand other ways 
than the ancients”.60 Virtue, for him is, not pagan but, Christian virtue. What the pagans 
praised as virtue (such as, prowess, courage and toughness), Tocqueville condemns as 
impure. The ancients placed “the harsh and half-savage virtues” at the top of the list, while 
“the soft virtues, such as humanity, pity, indulgence, self-forgetting were last”. 61  
Christianity promoted equality, unity, human brotherhood; and it placed the purpose of life 
after life itself, and hence gave life a purer character, more immaterial, more disinterested, a 
higher morality than the ancients ever had. The ancients seemed to have reduced virtue to a 
matter of political passion and thus acted according to their own desires. Plutarch’s great 
commanders showed character, but often applied their will in the cause of evil rather than 
of good, which made them sometimes fall below humanity. Their desire for glory was often 
stronger than their sense of duty to humanity. 
For Tocqueville, then, the standard for human action is set, not by the ancients but, 
by Christ.62 God has given or revealed to humankind the standard of good and evil, by 
which it can be proven that those who reject those standards do evil. Tocqueville’s criticism 
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of the Enlightenment is precisely that it has introduced its own human and thus mediocre 
standards so as to make civil peace possible. He seeks to reform the Enlightenment by a 
return to the Christian principles and norms, 63  without renouncing the liberal ideas (in 
particular of Montesquieu and Rousseau) that the Enlightenment has introduced. 64  He 
embraces the liberal ideas that the Enlightenment has introduced, but he rejects the passion 
for autonomy that it has legitimized. For autonomy not only makes man indifferent to virtue 
and vice, but it also blurs the vision of the greatness of the ancient commanders. Simone 
Weil argues that Plutarch offers a false notion of greatness and therefore modern people 
have nothing to learn from the great commanders, but for Tocqueville, this notion of 
greatness may well trigger the passion for the public pursuit of the virtues.   
 
  
3. Tocqueville’s political theology 
 
Tocqueville argues that the Christian religion is the mediator between the city of man and 
the city of God. The proper function of religion is to suffuse all secular life, public and 
private, with its light, without ever dominating it. For him, religion, rather than philosophy 
or science, is the road to enlightenment. It is for this reason that religion cannot be relegated 
to the private sphere. Religion is not a set of intellectual propositions, but a way of private 
and public life in which understanding, believing and loyalty emerge in a single act entered 
upon as a result of an actual initiation into communal worship.65 Religion has a public 
function, namely, to “regulate both the relations of the individual with his Creator and, his 
rights and duties towards his fellow men on a universal plane, independently, that is to say, 
of the views and habits of the social group of which he is a member”.66  
Tocqueville's conception of religion is Catholic.67 He grants the secular world a 
relative autonomy under the surveillance of the eternal world and aims at “a perfect accord 
between the religious world and the political world, private and public virtues, Christianity 
and liberty”.68 He recognizes no contradiction between secular and religious moralities: a 
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well-integrated harmony between Heaven and Earth is “indispensable to the daily practice 
of men’s lives”.69 He searches for a practical balancing of conflicting elements taken from 
the political ideal of self-government and the religious ideal of the perfection of the soul, 
which are in a perpetual tension with, and yet, in need of one another. As he says:  
 
Where politics are concerned, the attitude that comes naturally to the Christian is one 
of indifference; though an excellent member of the Christian civitas, he is but an 
imperfect citizen in the mundane sense. Such sentiments and convictions when they 
obtain in a group of men called on to shape the minds and morals of a country’s youth 
are bound to have a debilitating effect on the mores of the nation as a whole in matters 
touching on public life.70
 
Tocqueville seeks to harmonize the secular and the eternal world in the modern world 
through the reconciliation of the Christian and the citizen. For him, being a good Christian 
is very close to being a good citizen. There is no way to be excellent as a Christian which 
does not involve Christian virtue as a citizen, since citizenship, for him, is defined as the 
assistance offered to the fellows for the love of God.71 Hence, true citizenship is always 
charitable. 
 Tocqueville recognizes an intimate relationship between citizenship and being a 
true Christian, and argues that, in democratic society, it is via active citizenship that 
solidarity or public morality is generated. Ecclesiastical authority has lost its influence over 
the human minds and hearts; it is no longer able to appeal to people’s conscience and bind 
them to the community of saints. Though Tocqueville, differently from the enlightenment 
thinkers, always praises the spirit of the clergy of the past and considers himself to be a 
proud member of the Roman Catholic Church, he nevertheless believes that the old 
institutional forms of religious life are no longer effective. In modern societies, secular 
authority must assume the religious task of liberation and renewal. Tocqueville does not 
charge the government with the task of announcing “the good news” of Christ’s 
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resurrection, but he does argue that governments ought to apply “the practical means of 
teaching men the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.”72 He further explains that “the 
sole effectual means that governments can employ in order to have the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul duly respected is always to act as if they believed in it 
themselves”.73  
In other words, governments should always behave as if God is watching them. 
Then, the governed may imitate their behavior and perhaps acquire a genuine faith and 
discover that in giving up their old habits, they have in fact lost nothing. Tocqueville 
believes that the citizen’s passion for liberty can be triggered when the governors show 
them that it is in their own interest that they govern themselves for the sake of their eternal 
destiny. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a crucial element of Tocqueville's 
political theology. For him, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is the most powerful 
idea that ties the supreme interests of life – God, virtue, and immortality – to human actions. 
The doctrine has primarily a moral function: “the inclusion of the idea of another world and 
the innate taste for the good [is necessary] to keep human beings honest.”74 The moral 
function of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is that it promises reward for the 
faithful and virtuous life and punishment for the faithless and vicious life.75 Immortality is a 
distinction won by personal efforts. Tocqueville does not believe that it is possible for 
ordinary people to be virtuous without the belief that their efforts will eventually be 
rewarded in the after world; and therefore he stresses that “it is God who recompenses 
virtue, it is God who gives it.”76  
 When the government is called on to put the doctrine of the immortality of the soul 
in action by setting the standard for virtuous action, the citizen is meant to conform his 
actions to that standard. Tocqueville attaches the notion of dignity to that of virtue, and 
argues that, for Christians, it is no longer enough to participate in the community of saints: 
they must also participate in the polity. For, the apostolic duty that all Christians share is no 
longer to be fulfilled within the context of the Church, but they now have to govern their 
fellow citizens in the context of different worldviews. The transformation of Christians into 
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citizens implies that Tocqueville makes some serious concessions to the Christian tradition 
and the old forms of religious life, which, for him, were valid for a different, that is, 
aristocratic world. The dilemma is that in the modern era, pride and humility must be 
subject to revaluation. It is impossible to be a Christian if one does not know humility; yet, 
it is impossible to be a citizen if one does not know pride. If the Christian is to become a 
citizen in order to govern, he must be motivated by pride and desire for greatness to get out 
of the Church and into the polity. If the Christian knows no pride, or condemns pride tout 
court, there is no reason for him to participate in a public life where he cannot feel at home. 
In the modern world, pride, which is a vice, can no longer be condemned to harshly.77  
 The necessary synthesis between the Christian and citizen involves a concession to 
the Christian orthodoxy that holds that pride is so much a universal defect in human nature 
(original sin) that it belongs to the constitutive cause of the human predicament. In this 
tradition, the true Christian has no interest in this world, shows neither sorrow nor ambition, 
nor the desire to interfere in political affairs. The true Christian only seeks the truths that are 
necessary to his own salvation as well as that of his fellows, and prays that the good of the 
government may accord with the will of God. St Augustine quotes from the Holy Bible that 
“God resists the proud, but he gives grace to the humble” and comments that “this is God's 
prerogative; but man’s arrogant spirit in its swelling pride has claimed it as its own, and 
delights to hear this verse quoted in its own praise: to spare the conquered, and beat down 
the proud”.78 Bossuet holds that “it is pride that disunites us, because each seeks his own 
good”79 and urges us “not to lead a life that is half holy, and half profane; half Christian, 
half mondaine”.80 Fénelon argues that “the great obstacle is the mad wisdom of the century, 
which wants to entrust nothing to God, which wants to do everything by its own industry, 
arrange everything by itself, and to admire itself constantly in its works”.81 Pascal insists 
that liberty and virtue within the city of men is an illusion, because pride prevents the 
unbeliever from receiving grace.82 It is not the person who does not truly desires to be free, 
but the one who disdains and is too weak to bear his simplicity who is mediocre for Pascal. 
By making people acutely aware of their own mediocrity, their mortality, of the 
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corruptibility of all temporal matters, and of the power of evil (hatred, envy, cruelty) in 
them, Pascal clearly sets limits to the political possibilities for establishing the free and 
virtuous life.83  As an Augustinian, Pascal considers the city of men (the polity) as the 
domain or kingdom of the devil. Hence, Tocqueville’s suggestion that the statesman is 
called to bring humankind back to a state of faith – the statesman who is part of the city of 
men rather than the city of God – is not realistic.84
Yet, Tocqueville is a realist and does not suffer from cultural nostalgia or 
nineteenth century romanticism. For the Christian apologists, pride or lack of humility 
makes the mediocre person think that he can be his own god and govern himself. 
Tocqueville’s understanding of pride, however, is different. For the apologists, a harmony 
between the city of men and the city of God is impossible, because pride, for them, means 
putting one’s own will before the will of God. The statesmen, those proud commanders and 
spokespersons of the common good, are incapable of guiding humankind towards the free 
and good life because their pride prevents them from obeying the good in the first place. 
Tocqueville, however, adopts a notion of pride, which is somewhat different from that of 
the Christian moralists. In his understanding, pride means something like “right ambition”, 
which strongly resembles Aristotle’s definition of pride: pride as a necessary condition for 
personal grandeur and strong individuality.85 Understood as “right ambition”, pride is still a 
sin because it stands in contrast with Christ’s humility, but it is a sin that produces several 
civic virtues. Tocqueville says that “pride restrains the most imperious of human 
passions”86 and “fosters a healthy self-respect and often an overmastering desire to make a 
name for oneself”.87 It makes man inured to civic hardships, indifferent to the amenities of 
life, intrepid in the face of political and moral danger and capable enough to cope with 
physical and mental suffering.88 Though pride prevents man from becoming a saint, it is a 
passion that enables the Christian to act as a citizen.89 Pride prevents man from falling into 
mediocre snobbery (that is, a feeling of superiority vis-à-vis others, which destroys human 
dignity) and it keeps meek conformity and feebleness in check. 90 Thus understood, pride 
 20
moderates the extremes of vanity and slavish humility. In the modern world, with all its 
temptations and materialism, pride is socially necessary to revivify the human spirit.  
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